The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents by Bartling, Björn & Von Siemens, Ferdinand A
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2010
The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard
with envious agents
Bartling, B; Von Siemens, F
Bartling, B; Von Siemens, F (2010). The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious
agents. Labour Economics, 17(3):598-607.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Labour Economics 2010, 17(3):598-607.
Bartling, B; Von Siemens, F (2010). The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious
agents. Labour Economics, 17(3):598-607.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Labour Economics 2010, 17(3):598-607.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=896067
The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets:
Moral Hazard with Envious Agents
Bjo¨rn Bartling
University of Zurich
Ferdinand von Siemens
University of Amsterdam
October 2009∗
forthcoming in: Labour Economics
Abstract
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms
are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation
based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive
higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general
moral hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing
incentives. We show that envy creates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts if agents
are risk-averse and there is no limited liability. Empirical evidence suggests that social
comparisons are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals
that interact in markets. Flat-wage contracts are then more likely to be optimal in firms.
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1 Introduction
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms
or organizations are often not explicitly incentivized. For example, freelance writers are
commissioned to write articles of precisely specified length, business consultants are paid
hourly wages while completing a particular mandate, and the salaries of independent software
programmers condition on processing a specific project. In contrast, permanent employees
conducting the same tasks largely receive a fixed income.1 While implicit means like career
concerns can also provide strong incentives, it is puzzling why firms often abstain from
using monetary incentives as an additional instrument. This paper offers an explanation
for different levels of explicit incentives in firms and markets that is based on envy among
agents and the observation that social comparisons are more pronounced within firms than
among individuals that interact in markets.
We analyze the impact of envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model
with multiple agents. An envious agent suffers a utility loss whenever another agent receives
a higher wage. In our model, each agent can exert some costly but unobservable effort that
increases the principal’s expected revenue. To provide incentives the principal must condi-
tion agents’ wages on stochastic performance measures. Chance variations in performance
measures create wage inequality, which affects envious agents’ effort choices and participation
decisions. We show that if agents are risk-averse and there is no limited liability,2 then envy
renders incentive provision more expensive relative to the case with purely self-interested
agents. However, agents can always be induced to choose their cost-minimizing effort levels
by paying them equal flat-wages. In this case envy causes no additional costs. Since envy
increases the cost of implementing higher effort levels, flat-wage contracts can be optimal in
situations in which the principal would otherwise provide incentive contracts. Moreover, so-
cial comparisons like envy appear to be more pronounced among employees within firms than
among individuals who only interact via the market. Envy is then more likely to render flat-
wage contracts optimal within firms than in markets – even if the underlying principal-agent
problems are otherwise identical.
1This observation goes back at least to Williamson (1975). In the words of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991):
“It remains a puzzle for this theory that employment contracts so often specify fixed wages and more generally
that incentives within firms appear to be so muted, especially compared to those of the market”(p. 24).
2In this context, limited liability means that contractual wage levels cannot be reduced below a minimum
threshold. For example, a negative bonus (“malus”) in case of bad performance may not be feasible due to
limited liability.
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In addition to providing an explanation for differences in incentive intensities in firms and
markets, our theoretical analysis shows in general how envy affects the optimal provision of
incentives in moral hazard models. There are two effects. First, if an agent can decrease the
probability of receiving a lower wage than the other agent by exerting more effort, then this
relaxes the incentive constraint in the principal’s optimization program. Second, if an agent
must be compensated for expected wage inequality, then this tightens the participation
constraint. While these effects have been shown in less general models before,3 our general
analysis enables us to exactly identify the assumptions on the source of the moral hazard
problem that lead envy either to increase or to decrease the cost of providing incentives. We
disentangle the countervailing effects of envy in a model that (i) allows for both risk-neutral
and risk-averse agents and (ii) comprises the cases with and without limited liability. By
transforming the principal’s maximization program, we show that envy affects the principal’s
minimum cost of providing incentives in exactly two ways. First, envy allows the principal
to decrease an agent’s utility by paying another agent a higher wage. If monetary sanctions
are restricted by limited liability, then envy enlarges the principal’s feasible set of utility
combinations for the agents. In this case the positive incentive effect of envy can decrease
agency costs. Second, envious agents must be compensated for their utility loss from
expected unfavorable wage inequality. If the optimal incentive contract implies unequal
wage payments with strictly positive probability, then envy causes additional costs.
For the case with risk-averse agents and no limited liability we then show that envy can
render flat-wage contracts optimal. Since there is no limited liability, the cost decreasing
effect of envy cannot arise. The principal can however adjust incentive contracts to mitigate
expected wage inequality and the necessary compensation thereof. But it is not possible
to reduce expected wage inequality without increasing the agents’ risk exposure, while
holding incentives constant. Thus, with risk-averse agents and no limited liability, envy
unambiguously increases the costs of providing incentives relative to the case with purely
self-interested agents. If these costs of envy are large relative to the profitability of higher ef-
fort choices, then it is optimal not to incentivize agents and offer equitable flat-wage contracts.
Our assumptions concerning the agents’ social preferences are supported by empirical
evidence. With regard to social preferences within firms, surveys by Blinder and Choi
(1990), Campbell and Kamlani (1990), and Agell and Lundborg (2003) suggest that equity
3See e.g. Itoh (2004) for an analysis with risk-neutral agents.
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concerns among co-workers are important and constitute a reason for downwards wage
rigidity. In a related study, Bewley (1999) finds that “The main function of internal [pay]
structure is to ensure internal pay equity, which is critical for good morale.”(p. 82) Moreover,
numerous carefully conducted laboratory experiments confirm that fairness and equity
concerns are important human motives.4
With regard to our assumption that social comparisons are more pronounced within firms
than in markets, Bewley (1999) conculdes that “Pay levels in different firms are only loosely
linked, unlike pay rates within company operating units. Whereas resentment and jealousy
compel internal structure, the main ties among pay levels in different firms are the forces
of supply and demand”(p. 86). This is in line with Festinger (1954), who develops a theory
of social comparisons based on the assumption that equity concerns are more pronounced
among individuals who perceive themselves to be equal. Adams (1963) subsequently argues
that “co-workers will more neatly fit this criterion than will other persons”(p. 424). Akerlof
and Yellen (1988) summarize this line of reasoning: “But, in contrast to the marketplace,
where traders have little personal contact, in the workplace, where personal contact is
close, other emotions such as ‘concern for fairness’, pejoratively called ‘jealousy’, are also
important”(p. 45).5
Case studies analyzing the success of mergers also suggest that the boundary of the firm
can influence workers’ reference groups. A prominent example is Williamson’s (1985, p. 158)
discussion of the 1980 acquisition of Houston Oil and Minerals Corp. by Tenneco, Inc., the
largest conglomerate in the U.S. at that time. Houston’s business was to find and develop
petroleum and mineral deposits, and it had an unusually large bonus program in place
to reward its employees for the successful discovery and development of new reserves. To
preserve Houston’s entrepreneurial and risk-taking corporate culture, Tenneco planned to
maintain this pay structure upon merger, but ultimately failed to do so. The reasons for this
failure were apparently equity concerns within the conglomerate. Tenneco’s vice president
for administration told the The Wall Street Journal : “We have to ensure internal equity
and apply the same standards of compensation to everyone” (A-1, February 9, 1982). As
4See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for an overview of the experimental literature. Conflict-
ing evidence comes from Charness and Kuhn (2007) who do not find evidence for horizontal social comparisons
in a gift-exchange experiment framed in a labor market context.
5For evidence from organizational psychology see, e.g., Goodman (1974), Gartrell (1982), and Shah (1998).
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a result, Tenneco could not match outside job offers. Within a year a large fraction of
Houston’s employees had left for better opportunities elsewhere, which ultimately caused
the failure of the merger.6
Our paper complements existing theoretical explanations for lower incentive intensities
in firms than in markets. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) propose multi-tasking as an
explanation for low-powered incentives in firms. Like Williamson, they distinguish employees
from contractors by the condition of asset ownership. To balance asset maintenance and
output production, optimal output-based incentives for employees must be low-powered as
compared to those for contractors. Addressing the same question, Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (2002) analyze an infinitely repeated trade situation. Repeated game effects induce
an agent to choose a desired action and the principal to pay a promised bonus, while asset
ownership influences whether such relational contracts can be self-enforcing. Empirically,
the current theory can be distinguished from the existing explanations because it applies in
single-tasking settings as well as in one-shot situations. Moreover, in contrast to existing
explanations, our theory stresses the role of limited liability. It suggests that incentives are
weaker in firms than in markets in occupations where it is unlikely that limited liability
constraints are binding (such that envy can only increase the cost of providing incentives).
This implies larger incentive differences between firms and markets in occupations where
workers earn well above the legal minimum wage or above wages that result from union
bargaining. Section 3 discusses testable hypotheses in more detail.
Our model also makes a theoretical contribution to the literature that analyzes the impact of
social preferences in moral hazard settings with multiple agents.7 Itoh (2004) and Demougin
6In a related empirical study on mergers and acquisitions, Kwon and Meyersson-Milgrom (2008) also find
that firm boundaries influence workers’ reference groups.
7Itoh (2004), Englmaier and Wambach (2006), and Dur and Glazer (2008) analyze the impact of social
preferences in moral hazard models with a single agent. Grund and Sliwka (2005) analyze tournaments and
show that for given prizes inequity-averse agents exert higher effort than purely self-interested agents but that
the optimal tournament implements lower effort levels due to the necessary compensation for inequality; see
also Kra¨kel (2000). Rey Biel (2008) analyzes the positive incentive effect of envy in teams. Bartling and von
Siemens (2009) derive the equal sharing rule as the optimal incentive contract in teams with inequity averse
agents. Kragl and Schmid (2009) analyze the impact of envy on relational employment contracts. Meyer
and Mookherjee (1987) characterize cost-minimizing contracts when the principal’s objective function reflects
a preference for ex-post equality among agents. Since agents have standard preferences, the incentive and
participation constraints are unaffected so that the effects of envy as characterized in our model do not arise.
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and Fluet (2006) analyze optimal contracts when agents’ preferences reflect inequity aversion
or envy. Both papers focus on the optimality of either team contracts or relative performance
evaluation with risk-neutral agents and limited liability. In these models, the principal
can either avoid any cost increasing effect of social preferences by offering team contracts
or use relative performance evaluation to exploit the positive incentive effect. Demougin,
Fluet, and Helm (2006) and Neilson and Stowe (2008) also assume inequity-averse and
risk-neutral agents and investigate reasons for wage compression. They find that incentives
can be muted, but Demougin et al. eliminate the incentive effect of social preferences by
assuming that agents compare expected rents, and Neilson and Stowe restrict the analysis to
independent piece-rates. Goel and Thakor (2006) and Bartling (2008) characterize optimal
incentive contracts if other-regarding agents are risk-averse. Both papers, however, do not
consider the case with limited liability. Importantly, none of the above papers analyzes a
general moral hazard setting that allows one to identify how the countervailing effects of
envy on the principal’s optimization problem depend on assumptions about risk preferences
and limited liability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the moral hazard
problem, discusses the agents’ social preferences, and analyzes the general impact of envy
on optimal incentive contracts. Section 3 discusses the implications of our analysis for in-
centive intensities in firms and markets. Section 4 discusses some assumptions and further
implications of the model with regard to wage secrecy and the theory of the firm. Section 5
concludes. The appendix contains all formal proofs and a numerical example that illustrates
the effects of envy.
2 Optimal Incentive Contracts with Envious Agents
In this section we characterize the general impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts
for multiple agents. Consider a principal who employs two agents. If employed, each agent
chooses an effort level e from a finite set E. The effort vector e ∈ E2 determines the proba-
bility pi(x | e) of some outcome vector x drawn from a finite set X. Both the dimensionality
of x and the probability mass function pi are not restricted. Our model thus comprises situa-
tions with individually attributable outcomes, non-separable outcomes, or both. There is no
restriction on the correlation of individually attributable outcomes. An outcome realization
x determines the principal’s gross profit via the function f : X → R. While effort is taken
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to be non-contractible, the principal can verify the outcome vector. A contract thus assigns
each agent a wage w for every outcome realization x. Finally, a limited liability constraint
is imposed. Limited liability means that contractual wage levels cannot be reduced below
a minimum threshold. We model limited liability by restricting wage payments to lie in a
compact interval [w ,w ] ∈ R. Imposing also an upper limit simplifies the technical analysis
by rendering the relevant subset of the contract space - the constraint set - compact.8
Preferences
Our specification of social preferences is related to the theory of inequity aversion by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Whereas inequity-averse workers also
suffer from being better off, the survey evidence discussed in the introduction stresses the role
of jealousy or envy. In our model, we therefore assume that agents only suffer a utility loss
if the respective other agent is better off.9 Formally, if agent i exerts effort ei and receives
wage wi, his overall utility is defined as
Ui(wi, wj , ei) = u(wi)− ψ(ei)− γi(wi, wj)S(wi, wj) (1)
if the other agent j gets wage wj . It is thus additively separable in the following three
components. First, agent i enjoys utility u(wi) from his wage payment wi by the principal.
Function u is identical for both agents; it is strictly increasing, unbounded, continuous, and
weakly concave. We thus allow for both risk neutrality and risk aversion. Second, agent i
bears the personal cost ψ(ei) of his effort choice. Function ψ is assumed to be identical for
both agents; it is continuous, and strictly increasing.
Finally, an envious agent i suffers a utility loss γi(wi, wj)S(wi, wj) which is positive if the
other agent j receives a higher wage wj .10 Envy is split into the two components S(wi, wj)
and γi(wi, wj) to simplify algebraic manipulations and comparative statics. The function
S : R → R measures the perceived wage inequality. It is strictly decreasing in wj if wj is
strictly smaller than wi, and it is strictly increasing in wj if wj is strictly larger than wi. We
set S to zero at wi = wj . The perceived wage inequality is thus weakly positive. We assume
S to be continuous, but we impose no restrictions concerning curvature or differentiability.
8The upper limit will always be chosen such that it is non-binding, i.e. it does not impact any of our results.
9In Section 4 we argue that our results are only reinforced if agents also suffer from favorable wage inequality.
10In Section 4 we discuss the assumption that agents only compare wages and argue that accounting for
effort costs would not change our qualitative results. Note that agents do not perform interpersonal utility
comparisons but only wage comparisons.
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The second component of envy, the weighing function γi, measures how much agent i suffers
from the wage inequality depending on whether he is ahead or behind; it is defined as
γi(wi, wj) =
 0 if wi ≥ wjαi if wi < wj . (2)
The constant αi ≥ 0 can thus be interpreted as agent i’s degree of envy. We do not restrict
αi to equal αj , thus agents might differ in their degree of envy. The vector α = (αi, αj)
describes the agents’ degrees of envy.
Both agents maximize their expected overall utility. Their outside options are normalized
at U¯ . The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral and interested only in his expected gross
profit minus expected wage payments. We thus assume that he does not compare his profit
to the agent’s wage levels. This mirrors our assumption that the agents’ reference groups are
confined to the respective other agent.
Principal’s Optimization Problem
The characterization of the optimal incentive contract follows Grossman and Hart (1983)
and Mookherjee (1984). In the first step, the principal derives the second-best cost incentive
scheme that implements a given effort vector e as a Nash equilibrium among the agents,
subject to the constraints that the agents receive at least their reservation utilities and
choose the desired effort level. If a solution to this minimization problem exists, it yields the
second-best costs. If no solution exists, these costs are set to plus infinity. Given degrees
α of envy, this generates a second-best cost function CSB(e,α) for every effort vector e.
In the second step, maximizing the principal’s expected profit minus costs determines the
optimal effort vector e and the associated optimal contracts.
To clarify the overall impact of envy we reformulate the principal’s optimization problem.
Define agent i’s utility from money as the sum of his utility u(wi) from his wage and the
potential utility loss γi(wi, wj)S(wi, wj) from envy. An agent’s utility from money is thus
his overall utility Ui as defined in (1) excluding effort costs. Let the vector (vi, vj) denote
a combination of utilities from money for agents i and j. Taking utilities from money as
control variables, a contract is a function v : X → R2 that assigns the agents utilities from
money vi(x) and vj(x) conditional on the realized outcome x. Let V be the space of all such
functions, and let V (α) be the set of all utility from money combinations the principal can
grant the agents by paying them wages in [w , w ]. Let the function h : R2 × R+ × R+ → R
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describe the principal’s minimum costs if agents with degrees α ∈ R+ × R+ of envy are to
receive combination (vi, vj) ∈ R2 of utilities from money. We call h the principal’s indirect
cost function. Both V and h depend on the degree α of envy in a way to be made precise
below.
Suppose the principal wants to implement an effort vector e at the least cost, facing agents
with degrees α of envy. The second-best costs CSB(e,α) are then determined by minimizing
his expected wage payments ∑
x∈X
pi(x | e)h(v(x),α) (3)
with respect to the contract v, subject to the constraints∑
x∈X
pi(x | e) vi(x)− ψ(ei) ≥ U¯ (4)∑
x∈X
[pi(x | e)− pi(x | e′i , ej)] vi(x)− [ψ(ei)− ψ(e′i)] ≥ 0 (5)
v(x) ∈ V (α) for all x ∈ X (6)
for i = 1, 2 and for all e′i ∈ E. The participation constraints (4) ensure that both agents
accept the contract. The incentive constraints (5) render it optimal for each agent to
choose the desired effort level conditional on the other agent doing the same. Finally, the
limited liability constraint (6) restricts the principal to assign utilities from money that are
attainable by paying wages from the interval [w , w ]. A contract is incentive compatible if
it satisfies the incentive constraints (5). It is incentive feasible if in addition it fulfills the
participation constraints (4). The contracts satisfying the constraints (4) and (5) form the
feasible set. Finally, the constraint set consists of all incentive feasible contracts that also
fulfill the limited liability constraint (6).
Inspection of the principal’s program shows that envy enters the program in exactly two
ways: First, via the set V (α) of possible utilities from money and, second, via the indirect
cost function h(v,α). In the following we analyze the impact of these two effects on the
principal’s second-best costs CSB(e,α).
Set of Attainable Utility from Money Combinations
If the agents are to receive utilities from money (vi, vj), their wages (wi, wj) must satisfy
u(wi)− γi(wi, wj)S(wi, wj) = vi (7)
u(wj)− γj(wi, wj)S(wi, wj) = vj . (8)
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The following lemma greatly simplifies the ensuing analysis. All formal proofs can be found
in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Ranking) Consider some (vi, vj) with vi ≥ vj. Then any solution (wi, wj) to
(7) and (8) satisfies wi ≥ wj.
Suppose agent i receives a weakly higher wage than agent j. Since both agents share the
same utility from wage function, agent i then receives a weakly higher utility u(w). Agent i
does not suffer a utility loss from envy, whereas agent j might suffer from envy if his wage
is strictly smaller. Hence, agent i receives a weakly higher utility from money. This yields
Lemma 1. If vi ≥ vj , equations (7) and (8) are thus equivalent to
wi = u−1(vi) (9)
u(wj)− αj S
(
u−1(vi), wj
)
= vj . (10)
We can now analyze the set of attainable utility from money combinations. Rendering our
previous definition more precise, let V (α) be the set of all utility from money combinations
(vi, vj) ∈ R2 for which there exist wages (wi, wj) ∈ [w ,w ]2 solving (9) and (10). Then
Proposition 1 (Attainable Utility from Money Combinations) For given degrees α
of envy and interval [w ,w ] of possible wage levels, the set
V (α) =
{
(v1, v2) ∈ R2 : if vi ≥ vj then
vi ∈
[
u(w) , u(w)
]
and vj ∈
[
u(w)− αj S(u−1(vi), w ), vi
] }
(11)
characterizes the set of attainable utility from money combinations. Envy thus increases the
set of attainable utility from money combinations.
Envy never increases the utility of an agent, hence the maximum attainable utility from
money remains at u(w). However, an envious agent suffers a utility loss when the other agent
receives a higher wage. By creating unfavorable wage inequality, the principal can reduce an
envious agent’s minimum utility from money below the level that a selfish agent derives from
the minimum wage. Figure 1 offers an illustration. If both agents receive the minimum wage,
there is no wage inequality and they receive the utility from money combination [u(w), u(w)].
Suppose the principal now increases the wage of, say, agent 1 but holds the wage of agent 2
fixed. The utility from money of agent 1 then rises as he enjoys the increased wage. Since
his wage is higher than agent 2’s wage, he does not suffer from envy. Agent 2’s utility from
9
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Figure 1: Set of Attainable Utility from Money Combinations. The shaded
areas indicate the additional utility from money combinations rendered attainable by
envy.
money, however, is reduced by envy. He now receives u(w)−α2 S(u−1(v1), w). In Figure 1 this
corresponds to a movement from the lower left corner of the set along the curve that confines
the right shaded area from below. Envy thus enlarges the set of attainable utility from money
combinations, that is, envy enlarges the principal’s constraint set. A relaxed constraint set to
the principal’s program might allow the principal to employ a cheaper contract, hence envy
can have a decreasing effect on the principal’s second-best cost CSB(e,α).
Principal’s Indirect Cost Function
Above we have identified a potential cost decreasing impact of envy. We now turn to the
effect of envy on the principal’s indirect cost function h(v,α) and show that envy can also
increase the costs of providing incentives. Suppose the principal wants to provide the agents
with a utility from money combination (vi, vj) which satisfies vi ≥ vj . The corresponding
wages (wi, wj) must then solve (9) and (10). Strict monotonicity of both the utility function u
and the left hand side of (10) imply that (9) and (10) have a unique solution. The sum of
these wages characterizes the principal’s costs h(vi, vj ,α). The effect of envy on the indirect
cost function can then be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 2 (Indirect Cost Function) Suppose the principal wants to grant the agents
utilities from money (vi, vj) ∈ R2 with vi ≥ vj. Then his indirect cost function h(v,α) is
1. independent of αi,
2. independent of αj if vi = vj, and
3. strictly increasing in αj if vi > vj.
Agent j’s envy thus causes strictly positive extra indirect costs if and only if vi > vj.
Inspection of (9) and (10) shows that the agents must receive different wages if and only if
they are to receive different utilities from money. The agent with the lower wage, agent j, then
suffers from envy. If he is to receive a particular utility from money, he must be compensated
for the utility loss from envy. This entails extra costs for the principal that are increasing in
agent j’s utility loss and thus in his degree αj of envy. Consequently, envy renders a contract
more expensive if and only if the agents are given different utilities from money with strictly
positive probability in equilibrium. Envy can thus have an increasing effect on the principal’s
second-best costs CSB(e,α).
The Overall Effect of Envy
The above analysis shows that the impact of envy on the principal’s program is twofold. First,
envy enlarges the set of attainable utility from money combinations. Second, envy renders
the implementation of unequal utility from money combinations more expensive. The first
effect weakly reduces, whereas the second effect weakly increases agency costs relative to the
case with purely self-interested agents. The overall effect of envy on the principal’s minimum
costs of providing incentives thus depends on the underlying principal agent problem. On the
one hand, if limited liability does not restrict the principal’s contract choice, enlarging the
set of attainable utility from money combinations is irrelevant. Envy can therefore reduce
agency costs only if the limited liability constraint is binding. On the other hand, wage
inequality is endogenous – it is determined by the principal’s contract choice. The principal
might be able to use a team contract that eliminates all wage inequality among agents. Envy
can thus increase agency costs only if the principal cannot employ such a team contract while
preserving incentives, or if using such a team contract comes at a cost. Such costs arise if, for
example, agents are risk-averse and the team contract increases their risk exposure.11 Table 1
provides an overview of the different cases that can result.
11Notice that risk neutrality is not a sufficient condition such that wage inequality can be avoided at no
cost. For example, it could be that no state of the world exists in which all agents are successful. To avoid
11
limited liability limited liability
constraint binding constraint not binding
agents risk-neutral weakly cost decreasing no effect
agents risk-averse ambiguous weakly cost increasing
Table 1: The Impact of Envy on the Cost of Providing Incentives.
These results show how the findings of Itoh (2004) and Demougin and Fluet (2006) depend
on their assumptions concerning agents’ risk preferences and limited liability. They consider
settings with risk-neutral agents and binding limited liability constraints and show that
envy can only reduce agency costs. With risk neutrality, optimal contracts for purely
self-interested agents are not unique and, in particular, include an extreme team contract
in which the agents are paid a positive and equal wage only if all agents are successful.
By choosing such a team contract, wage inequality (for which the principal would have
to compensate the agents) can be avoided at no cost. Yet firms have the option to use
individual or relative performance evaluation to exploit the positive incentive effect of
envy and reduce the agents’ rents. This positive incentive effect can outweigh the involved
necessary compensation for inequality; in case it does not, the team contract will be chosen.
The advantage of our general set-up is that we can show how the effects of envy on the
costs of providing incentives depend on the details of the underlying moral hazard problem.
A disadvantage is that it is not possible to derive closed form solutions. Explicit optimal
contracts can only be derived in numerical examples. In the appendix we provide one such
example to illustrate the effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives in the different
cases.
Optimality of Flat-Wage Contracts
We have shown that in the case with risk-averse agents and no limited liability envy
weakly increases the cost of providing incentives. In this subsection we formally show that
the more tedious case distinction “inequality avoidable at no cost” and “inequality avoidable only at a cost,”
in what follows we distinguish the cases “risk neutrality” and “risk aversion” and implicitly assume that wage
inequality can be avoided at no cost if agents are risk-neutral, such as in the models by Itoh (2004) and
Demougin and Fluet (2006).
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these increased agency costs can render flat-wage contracts optimal. To simplify matters,
we assume that each agent i manages his own project that generates a stochastic and
individually attributable outcome xi. Project outcomes are taken to be independent, thus
the probability pii(xi|ei) of outcome xi exclusively depends on agent i’s effort. We thus
consider a situation with x = (x1, x2) and pi(x1, x2 | e) = pi1(x1 | e1)pi2(x2 | e2). Note that we
do not require projects to be symmetric, i.e. without envy it can be optimal to offer both
agents different incentive contracts. To avoid situations where there is no trade-off between
incentives and insurance, projects have full support, i.e. pi(xi|ei) > 0 for all effort levels and
outcomes. Finally, we assume that the interval [w ,w ] is sufficiently large so that for every
effort vector any solution to the principal’s minimization program (3) to (5) satisfies the
limited liability constraint (6).
To formalize the overall effect of envy we define the envy costs as the additional cost due
to envy if the principal wants to implement some effort vector e . Let e denote the effort
vector that minimizes each agent’s effort cost, and call an effort vector implementable if the
corresponding feasible set is non-empty. The following lemma then follows from our analysis.
Corollary 1 (Envy Costs, Risk-Aversion, and No Limited Liability) Suppose the
agents are risk-averse, there is no limited liability, project outcomes are independent, and
there is full support. Then the envy costs of any implementable effort vector e are strictly
positive if and only if e 6= e.
In the proof we show that the implementation of all effort levels e 6= e causes wage inequality
and thus strictly positive envy costs. The cost-minimizing effort levels e, however, can be
implemented by paying flat-wages. Since in our model both agents share the same effort cost
function, there arises no wage inequality and thus no envy costs. If for all higher effort levels
e 6= e the envy costs exceed the benefits from implementation, then envy renders flat-wage
contracts optimal.12
3 Incentive Intensities in Firms and Markets
In this section we discuss the implications of our theoretical analysis for incentive differences
in firms and markets. As argued by Hart (1995) in the context of the theory of the firm,
12When we say that a certain contract is optimal, we implicitly assume that the principal’s profit is non-
negative. Otherwise, no contract can be the optimal solution.
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principal-agent models allow for different interpretations of what they represent. Our model
can thus be interpreted as representing either a firm with two employees or market-mediated
contracts between a buyer and two independent suppliers. Moreover, social comparisons like
envy appear to be more pronounced among workers within a firm than among individuals
who interact in the market (see our discussion of the evidence in the introduction). Our
analysis therefore implies that any effect of envy on optimal contracts should be more
pronounced within firms as compared to market interactions.
In Section 2 we showed that the impact of envy on the cost of providing incentives depends
on (i) whether or not limited liability constraints are binding and (ii) whether agents are
risk-averse or risk-neutral. We consider the case where all agents are risk-neutral (such that
it is possible to provide incentives but avoid unequal wage payments at no cost) to be a
theoretical knife edge case that is unlikely to be satisfied in reality. Thus, with regard to
implications that can be tested with field data, we focus on the case with risk-averse agents.
The relevant question is then whether or not limited liability constraints are binding. On the
one hand, with binding limited liability constraints the effect on envy on agency costs and
thus incentive intensities is ambiguous. In this case, no systematic differences in incentive
intensities between firms and markets are predicted. On the other hand, with non-binding
limited liability constraints envy unambiguously increases the agency costs of providing
incentives. However, firms can implement low, effort cost minimizing effort level by paying
equitable flat-wages. As shown above, envy then causes a tendency towards flat-wages. This
effect will be stronger within firms than in markets as social comparisons appear to be more
pronounced in firms than in markets.
Which testable hypotheses follow from our theory? Our analysis points at the importance of
limited liability, but it is difficult to directly observe whether limited liability constraints are
binding or not. However, it is plausible to assume that limited liability constraints are more
relevant for workers earning (close to) the legal minimum wage or for workers in occupations
that pay hourly wages that result from firm-union bargaining.13 From this we can state the
following hypothesis.
13We thank one referee for pointing this out.
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Hypothesis For occupations that pay base salaries above the required legal or firm-union
bargained wage (limited liability constraints are likely not to be binding), incentive intensities
are lower in firms than in markets.
In which occupations do workers earn the legal minimum wage or wages that result from
firm-union bargaining? According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department
of Labor, in 2007 minimum wages were most prevalent in “service occupations” where 7.4
percent of workers were paid hourly rates with earnings at or below the prevailing U.S. federal
minimum wage; in the subcategory “food preparation and serving related occupations” even
15.6 percent of workers were paid wages at or below the minimum wage (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2008). In contrast, in “management, professional, and related occupations,” the
fraction of workers earning minimum wages amounted to 0.5 percent only. Our model thus
predicts that the difference in incentive intensities between firms and markets is larger in
“management, professional, and related occupations” than in “service occupations.”
Unionization rates also differ widely among occupations. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2009), in 2008 the overall U.S. union membership rate for private industry work-
ers was 7.6 percent. Within the private sector industry, relatively high unionization rates
were found in “transportation and utilities” (22.2 percent) and “telecommunications’ (19.3
percent) but relatively low rates in “financial activities” (1.8 percent) and “professional and
business services” (2.1 percent). Our model thus predicts that the difference in incentive
intensities between firms and markets is larger in “financial activities” or “professional and
business services” than in “transportation and utilities” or “telecommunications.”
4 Discussion
Inequity Aversion
Contrary to the theory of inequity aversion, we do not model the possibility that agents also
suffer from favorable wage inequality (compassion). However, doing so would only reinforce
our results on increased agency costs. Suffering from being better off has two effects. First,
an agent can get the highest utility from money only if the other agent also receives the
highest wage from the set of possible wages. If the other agent is to receive a lower utility
from money, he must be given a lower wage. The agent with the higher wage then suffers
from compassion. This shrinks the set of attainable utility from money combinations, which
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can reduce or even offset the potentially cost-reducing effect of envy in case limited liability is
restricting the principal’s contract choice.14 Second, if agents are to be given unequal utilities
from money, now also the agent with the higher wage must be compensated for his utility
loss, which requires the principal to strictly increase the corresponding wages. Consequently,
if agents are inequality averse instead of envious, the costs of providing incentives can only
increase.
Effort Costs in Social Comparisons
In our specification of envy, agents only compare wages. It is conceivable that agents also
account for effort costs in their comparisons. However, effort costs and wages accrue in
different dimensions such that it is not obvious how they are aggregated. Wages instead are
directly comparable and thus constitute the most salient reference point. Self-serving biases
are also likely to be important, i.e. agents might overvalue their effort contribution relative
to others. Nevertheless, suppose the agents in our model account for effort costs in their
social comparisons. An agent might then, ceteris paribus, want to lower his effort because
the resulting reduction in effort costs can only reduce his utility loss from envy. This effect
would lower incentives to exert effort, and thereby increase agency costs.15 We therefore
conjecture that our results on increased agency costs would hold or even be reinforced if we
included effort costs in the agents’ social comparisons.
Wage Secrecy
Our analysis shows that envy can increase the costs of providing incentives. If firms could
prevent such social comparison processes by keeping wages secret, these additional agency
costs were avoided. At first sight, our results could thus be regarded as a rationale for the
observation that many labour contracts prohibit employees from communicating their salaries
to their colleagues.16 However, before such an implication can be stated, two questions have
14If both agents receive the maximum wage, there is no inequality and the agents receive the utility from
money combination [u(w) , u(w) ]. In Figure 1 this corresponds to the right upper corner of the set of attainable
utility from money combinations. If, say, agent 2 receives a lower wage, then compassion also reduces agent
1’s utility from money. The right boundary of the set in Figure 1 is thus no longer attainable; the same is
true for the upper boundary.
15Indeed, in a model with linear contracts, Bartling (2008) shows that the incentive effect of other-regarding
preferences can even be negative if the agents account for effort costs in their social comparisons.
16See Lawler (1990) for an overview of the evidence. In different settings, Danziger and Katz (1997), Gan
(2002), Lavie (2008), and Lavie and Robin (2008) provide theoretical explanations for wage secrecy.
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to be answered. First, does wage secrecy indeed prevent or mitigate social comparisons?
And second, does wage secrecy restrict the principal’s contract choice? The first question
is an empirical issue that cannot be resolved in this paper. In the following, we discuss the
implications of different answers to this question on envy costs. Within our model, if the
principal follows a policy of wage secrecy, agents can form beliefs about the other agent’s
contract, effort choice, and thus wage. And they might suffer utility losses from believed
unfavorable wage differences (in this case denote the degree of envy by α˜) in a similar manner
as they suffer from observed unfavorable wage differences (where the degree of envy is α).
There are two assumptions concerning α˜ that yield clear predictions. First, if α˜ ≥ α, wage
secrecy cannot help reducing envy costs. Second, if α˜ = 0, wage secrecy clearly plays the
trick. The most plausible case is 0 < α˜ < α. But then the answer to the second question is
important. In our model, if the principal wants to keep wages secret, an agent’s wage must
not condition on the other agent’s performance as otherwise the other agent’s wage could
be inferred. A policy of wage secrecy thus constrains the principal’s contract choice because
interdependent contracts can be optimal to reduce the cost of envy or to reduce the agents’
risk exposure. Hence, the net effect of wage secrecy is ambiguous. Moreover, people tend
to overestimate rather than to underestimate other’s wages when wages are secret (see, e.g.,
Lawler 1965, Milkovich and Anderson 1972, Mahoney and Weitzel 1978). This can – in the
context of our model – only further increase envy costs.
Theory of the Firm
The results of our paper also relate to the theory of the firm. On the one hand, the
horizontal integration of firms can boost profits by reducing transaction costs or realizing
production complementarities. On the other hand, Williamson’s (1985) study of the Tenneco
and Houston case shows that changing the boundary of the firm can change the workers’
reference groups. Our analysis demonstrates that the resulting social comparisons like envy
can increase the agency costs of providing incentives. Hence, there are costs and benefits of
integration. In a related paper, Nickerson and Zenger (2008) also argue that while transac-
tion costs in the market generate a tendency towards integration, “social comparison costs
prompt managers to limit the degree of integration and otherwise take costly organizational
actions to restrict and efficiently manage these social comparison costs”(p. 1430). Our
paper provides a theoretical foundation for such social comparison costs and the resulting
organizational actions, which are in our model the adjustments of optimal incentive contracts.
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How important are social comparison costs in the wake of mergers? Williamson’s study of
the Tenneco and Houston case demonstrates that these costs can be substantial (see our
discussion in the introduction). Further evidence is provided by Kole and Lehn’s (2000)
case study of the merger of USAir with Piedmont Aviation. It confirms that the costs of
equity requirements can be large and significantly affect the profitability of mergers and
acquisitions. To avoid labour conflicts the management of USAir had conceded its labor
force wages that were relatively high as compared to industry standards. At the time of the
merger, employees at USAir thus received more generous remuneration schemes as compared
to their colleagues at Piedmont Aviation. After the merger, unions resisted plans to integrate
Piedmont Aviation as a subsidiary with less generous labor contracts. The management of
USAir gave in to this request for equal treatment and decided to adjust wages at Piedmont
Aviation upwards, thereby boosting labor costs. As a consequence, net profits fell from a
projected gain of 206 to a loss of 63 million USD in the year of the merger.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of envy in a moral hazard model with multiple agents that
allows for both risk-neutral and risk-averse agents and comprises the cases with and without
limited liability. We show that envy affects the principal’s minimum cost of providing
incentives in exactly two ways. First, the principal can aﬄict agents with additional
punishment by creating wage inequality. If limited liability restricts the principal’s use
of monetary punishments, envy can thus have a cost-decreasing effect. Second, envious
agents must be compensated for their utility losses from expected wage inequality if
they are to accept the principal’s contracts. Envy thus causes additional costs whenever
wage inequality arises with positive probability. Since envy can have a cost-increasing and
a cost-decreasing effect, its overall impact depends on the underlying principal-agent problem.
For the case with risk-averse agents and without limited liability we show that envy can
only increase the costs of providing incentives. However, envy causes no additional costs
if the principal implements the cost-minimizing effort levels by paying the agents equitable
flat-wages. In this case, envy generates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts. Since social
comparisons like envy appear to matter more within firms than in the marketplace, the paper
offers a behavioral explanation for the empirical observation that incentives within firms are
muted as compared to incentives in markets – even if the underlying principal-agent problems
are otherwise identical.
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Our theory can be distinguished from existing explanations for low-powered incentives in
firms because it stresses the role of limited liability. It suggests that incentives are weaker
in firms than in markets in occupations where it is unlikely that limited liability constraints
are binding, which implies larger incentive differences in occupations where workers earn well
above the legal minimum wage or above wages that result from union bargaining. Finally,
we discuss the implications of our analysis for the use of wage secrecy policies and for the
theory of the firm.
Appendix A: Formal Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose wi < wj . Then γi(wi, wj) = αi, γj(wi, wj) = 0, and u(wi) < u(wj). Thus, (wi, wj)
can solve (7) and (8) only if vi < vj . Consequently, any (wi, wj) that solves (7) and (8) for
vi ≥ vj must satisfy wi ≥ wj . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
It follows from (9) that wi ∈ [w ,w ] if and only if u−1(vi) ∈ [w ,w ]. It follows from Lemma 1
that wj ≤ wi so that any solution wj to (10) must lie in the interval [w , u−1(vi)]. For all
wj ∈ [w , u−1(vi)] the left hand side of (10) is strictly increasing and continuous in wj . It
takes on the value vi for wj = u−1(vi), and it takes on the value u(w)− αjS(u−1(vi), w) for
wj = w. As we have vi ≥ vj , the mean value theorem and monotonicity imply the existence
of a wj ∈ [w , u−1(vi)] if and only if u(w)− αj S(u−1(vi), w) ≤ vj . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
For vi ≥ vj consider (9) and (10). First, wi = u−1(vi) is unique by the strict monotonicity
of u. Second, wj is unique as the left hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in wj for all
wj ∈ [w , u−1(vi)]. Consequently, we get h(vi, vj) = wi + wj with (wi, wj) uniquely defined.
The properties of h follow directly from the properties of wi and wj . The solution wi = u−1(vi)
is independent of αi and αj . If vi = vj , then wj = u−1(vi) is the unique solution to (10),
and it is independent of αi and αj . If vi > vj , Lemma 1 implies that solutions to (10) satisfy
wj < wi. S(u−1(vi), wj) is then strictly positive. Increasing αj thus lowers the left hand side
of (10) which implies a counterbalancing increase in wj . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 1
We first prove necessity. The principal optimally implements e by paying both agents
flat-wages w = u−1(ψ(e)). As there is no wage inequality, the envy costs are zero.
We now prove sufficiency. Suppose the principal wants the agents to choose an implementable
effort vector e 6= e and agents are not envious. As h(vi, vj) = u−1(vi) + u−1(vj), the princi-
pal’s objective function (3) is continuous and strictly convex. By the (non-binding) limited
liability constraint (6), the feasible set is bounded. Since the constraints are characterized
by weak inequalities, the feasible set is closed. Since it is bounded, it is compact. The
considered effort vector is implementable, thus the feasible set is non-empty. The objective
function (3) of the principal’s program is continuous, therefore Weierstrass’ theorem implies
the existence of a solution v∗. Since it is strictly convex, the solution is unique.
Since e 6= e, there exists an agent i whose effort is not cost-minimizing. This agent cannot
be paid a fixed wage, because he would then choose the cost-minimizing effort. Hence,
there exist outcomes xi and x′i with v
∗
i (xi) > v
∗
i (x
′
i). We assume independent outcomes,
consequently Holmstro¨m’s (1979) sufficient statistics result implies that each agent’s wage
conditions only on his own output. There must thus exist an outcome (xi, xj) such that
v∗i (xi) 6= v∗j (xj). By assumption there is full support, therefore (xi, xj) arises with strictly
positive probability pii(xi|ei)pij(xj |ej) in equilibrium.
Since there is no limited liability, the optimal contract v∗ attains a global minimum. All other
incentive feasible contracts cause the principal strictly higher costs. By Proposition 2 envy
renders the optimal contract v∗ strictly more expensive because there arises wage inequality
in equilibrium. Since all other contracts are rendered weakly more expensive, the envy costs
are strictly positive. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Numerical Example
In this appendix we present a numerical example that illustrates the effects of envy on
optimal incentive contracts. Consider a principal and two agents who are identical concerning
their risk preferences and their envy parameter α. Each agent manages his own project
that generates a stochastic and individually attributable outcome x ∈ IR. Projects are
independent and identical. A project is either successful and generates a high outcome xh or
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it fails and generates a low outcome x`. Its success probability only depends on the respective
agent’s effort. Agents’ effort choices are binary. While low effort is costless, high effort
costs ψ > 0. A project’s success probability is pih with high effort and pil with low effort.
The agents’ outside options are normalized at U¯ . A contract specifies wages conditional on
project outcomes. As agents and projects are symmetric, we focus on symmetric contracts.
Let wss and wff be the agents’ wages if both projects are successful or both projects fail,
respectively. Let wsf be an agent’s wage if his project succeeds while the other agent’s project
fails. Define wfs analogously. Finally, denote by E(w) the principal’s expected wage payment.
Wages must be in the interval [w, w¯], where we assume w¯ to be sufficiently high so as to
never impose a binding constraint. To cover the four cases in Table 1 we vary the minimum
wage w and the agents’ risk aversion. By changing the minimum wage we can determine
whether the limited liability constraint is binding or not. By changing the agents’ risk
preferences we can determine the principal’s cost of mitigating wage inequality. The reason
is the following. The principal can always avoid wage inequality by paying equal wages
wsf = wfs if only one of the agents’ projects is successful. He can preserve incentives to
exert effort by paying particularly high wages wss if both projects are successful. However,
this contract disregards valuable information and thus exposes agents to unnecessarily high
risk. If agents are risk-neutral, this does not matter. If agents are risk-averse, they have to
be compensated for their risk exposure if the participation constraint is binding. Adjusting
contracts to reduce wage inequality then comes at a cost.
In the following we numerically compute the optimal contracts given the principal wants to
implement high effort from both agents. We assume the following parameters.
{pih = 0.60, pil = 0.40, ψ = 1.00, U¯ = 5.00} (12)
We vary α to illustrate the impact of envy on optimal contracts. Depending on whether
we consider the case of binding limited liability constraints or not, the minimum wage w is
either zero or 5.00. If agents are risk-neutral, their utility function is u(w) = w. If they are
risk-averse, their utility function is
u(w) = s+ w +
√
1 + 2.00 rw. (13)
The parameter r captures agents’ risk aversion; it is set to 25.00. Note that rendering
agents’ utility function concave causes a level effect: paying a risk-averse agent the same
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wage as a risk-neutral agent provides the former with a higher utility level. To preserve
some comparability we set s = −17.00. With non-binding limited liability constraint,
the principal’s expected wage costs are then in a similar range for risk-neutral and
risk-averse agents. The function S measuring the perceived wage inequality is defined as
S(wi, wj) = |u(wi)−u(wj)|. The numerical procedures used to compute optimal contracts are
available from the authors upon request. The reported numbers are rounded to two decimals.
If the principal wants to implement low effort from both agents, he can pay a flat-wage that
just compensates the agents for missing their outside options. For risk-neutral agents this
flat-wage is w = 5.00, for risk-averse agents it is w = 5.45. We further assume that given the
project outcomes the principal’s profit is governed by f(x) = x. The principal’s profit from
each project is thus independent and amounts to xh in case of success and to x` in case of
failure. We assume x` to be sufficiently large such that it is always optimal to employ the
agents - irrespective of whether an incentive or a flat-wage contract will be offered. We will
next discuss the four cases from Table 1.
A) Agents are risk-neutral and limited liability constraint not binding
We first show that envy has no effect on agency costs if agents are risk-neutral so that wage
inequality can be avoided at no cost, while limited liability does not constrain the principal’s
contract choice. The minimum wage is zero and, given the high outside option, imposes no
binding restriction on optimal contracts. Consequently, the principal can push agents down
to their outside option even when implementing high effort. Generalizing the proof in Itoh
(2004), we can show that the principal optimally sets the wages wfs and wff to the min-
imum wage of zero. Optimal contracts implementing high effort choices are shown in Table 2.
Only the participation constraint is binding and the agents receive no rents. However,
wage inequality tightens the participation constraint if agents are envious. It is thus in
the best interest of the principal to avoid all wage inequality by using an extreme team
contract. To generate incentives, he sets the wage wss that both agents get if both projects
are successful to 16.67, and all other wages to the minimum wages of zero. Since agents are
risk-neutral, this extreme team contract can be chosen at no extra cost - this contract is in
fact one of many optimal contracts if agents are not envious. Envy consequently has no effect.
Since envy has no effect, it does not influence what effort choices the principal optimally
implements. In this case it is optimal to implement high effort if and only if xh − x` ≥ 5.00.
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α wss wsf wfs wff E(w)
0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
0.10 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
0.20 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
0.30 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
0.40 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
0.50 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
Table 2: Optimal contracts if agents are risk-neutral and the limited liability con-
straint is not binding. Envy does not affect agency costs.
B) Agents are risk-neutral and limited liability constraint binding
We next show that envy strictly decreases agency costs if agents are risk-neutral so that
wage inequality can be avoided at no cost, while the limited liability constraint is binding.
The minimum wage is 5.00 and imposes a binding restriction on optimal contracts that
implement high effort choices. Again, the principal optimally sets wfs and wff to the
minimum wage, which in this case is 5.00. If agents are purely self-interested, the incentive
constraint renders the participation constraint redundant so that agents receive rents.
Optimal contracts implementing high effort choices are shown in Table 3.
Relative performance evaluation in combination with envy now generates strong incentives:
an agent suffers from envy if he is unsuccessful while the other agent is successful and
receives a higher wage. This positive incentive effect of envy allows the principal to reduce
wsf from 17.50 to 11.67. To maximize the positive incentive effect of envy, the principal
initially uses extreme relative performance evaluation by keeping wfs down to the minimum
wage of 5.00. As agents become more envious (up to α = 0.40), expected wage costs thus
fall from 8.00 to 6.88. However, as agents’ level of envy reaches α = 0.50, extreme relative
performance evaluation violates the participation constraint. The principal adjusts wss and
wsf to satisfy both incentive and participation constraint; he sets wss to 5.56 well above the
minimum wage of 5.00. Although the participation constraint limits the positive incentive
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α wss wsf wfs wff E(w)
0.00 5.00 17.50 5.00 5.00 8.00
0.10 5.00 15.87 5.00 5.00 7.61
0.20 5.00 14.62 5.00 5.00 7.31
0.30 5.00 13.62 5.00 5.00 7.07
0.40 5.00 12.81 5.00 5.00 6.88
0.50 5.56 11.67 5.00 5.00 6.80
Table 3: Optimal contracts if agents are risk-neutral and the limited liability con-
straint is binding. Envy decreases agency costs.
effect of envy, expected wages continue to fall to 6.80. As in the previous case, there is no
unique optimal contract implementing high effort choices if agents are purely self-interested.
If they are envious, the contract is unique and always has a relative performance component.
The above two cases illustrate the results in Itoh (2004) and Demougin and Fluet (2006).
Whether it is optimal for the principal to implement high effort choices in this case depends on
the agents’ envy parameter. For example, if xh−x` = 14.00, then it is optimal to implement
high effort choices if α = 0.10 (or higher) but not if α = 0.00.
C) Agents are risk-averse and limited liability constraint not binding
We next show that envy strictly increases agency costs if agents are risk-averse so that
wage inequality can no longer be avoided at zero cost, while the limited liability constraint
is not binding. The minimum wage is zero and imposes no binding restriction on optimal
contracts. Optimal contracts implementing high effort choices are shown in Table 4.
Since agents have a high outside option of 5.00 while the minimum wage is only 0.00, the
limited liability constraint can be ignored while the participation constraint must be binding.
If agents are purely self-interested, then Holmstro¨m’s (1979) sufficient statistics result implies
that an agent’s wage only depends on his project’s success and not on the success of the
project of the other agent. Hence the principal sets wss = wsf = 6.69 and wfs = wff = 4.67
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α wss wsf wfs wff E(w)
0.00 6.69 6.69 4.67 4.67 5.89
0.10 7.47 5.56 5.27 3.87 5.91
0.20 7.62 5.36 5.36 3.71 5.91
0.30 7.62 5.36 5.36 3.71 5.91
0.40 7.62 5.36 5.36 3.71 5.91
0.50 7.62 5.36 5.36 3.71 5.91
Table 4: Optimal contracts if agents are risk-averse and the limited liability constraint
is not binding. Envy increases agency costs.
for α = 0.00. But if agents are envious, the binding participation constraint implies that
they must be compensated for their suffering from envy. The sufficient statistics result no
longer holds and the principal reduces expected wage inequality by compressing wages in
case only one agent is successful. As agents become more envious, the principal thus reduces
wsf from 6.69 to 5.36 and increases wfs from 4.67 to 5.36. To preserve incentives, the
principal increases wss from 6.69 to 7.62 and decreases wff from 4.57 to 3.71. This imposes
additional risk on the agents. Since agents are risk-averse, they have to be compensated for
this rise in risk exposure. Hence the principal’s expected wage payments increase from 5.89
to 5.91. Note that if the level α of envy exceeds 0.10, then the principal optimally eliminates
all wage inequality by setting wsf = wfs = 5.36. This implies that once envy exceeds some
cutoff level, it has no further effect on the optimal contracts that implement high effort
choices.
Whether it is optimal for the principal to implement high effort choices in this case again
depends on the agents’ envy parameter. If xh − x` = 2.20, then it is optimal to implement
high effort choices with purely self-interested agents. However, if agents are slightly envious
(α = 0.10 or higher), then it is optimal to pay flat-wages that implement low effort choices.
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D) Agents are risk-averse and limited liability constraint binding
We finally investigate the impact of envy on agency costs if agents are risk-averse so that
wage inequality can no longer be avoided at zero cost, while the limited liability constraint is
binding. The minimum wage is 5.00 and imposes a binding restriction on optimal contracts.
Given our parameters, envy decreases agency costs, but the effect is not monotonic. Optimal
contracts implementing high effort choices are shown in Table 5.
α wss wsf wfs wff E(w)
0.00 7.05 7.05 5.00 5.00 6.23
0.10 5.48 8.94 5.00 5.00 6.12
0.20 5.89 7.93 5.00 5.00 6.02
0.30 6.54 6.91 5.00 5.00 6.01
0.40 6.87 6.41 5.00 5.00 6.01
0.50 7.07 6.12 5.00 5.00 6.02
Table 5: Optimal contracts if agents are risk-averse and the limited liability constraint
is binding. The effect of envy on agency costs is non-monotonic.
Minimum wages are so high that without envy the participation constraint is not binding, i.e.
agents receive rents. If agents are slightly envious, the principal can reduce expected wages
without violating the incentive constraint by using more relative performance evaluation: he
increases wsf from 7.05 to 8.94 which allows him to decrease wss from 7.05 to 5.48. Agents
still receive a rent, but envy reduces expected wages from 6.23 to 6.12. But as envy exceeds
α = 0.10, the use of relative performance evaluation renders the participation constraint
binding. Optimal contracts must then balance the requirements of both participation and
incentive constraints. In consequence, the principal increases wss from 5.48 to 7.07 and
decreases wsf from 8.94 to 6.12. Expected wages first fall from 6.12 to 6.01. But as agents
become even more envious (their level of envy reaches α = 0.50) the negative effect on their
participation constraint starts to offset the positive effect generated by relative performance
evaluation. Envy then starts to increase expected wage costs again, in our example from
6.01 to 6.02.
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It again depends on the agents’ envy parameter whether it is optimal for the principal to
implement high effort choices. The effect is ambiguous. For example, if xh−x` = 2.80 then it
is optimal to implement high effort choices if α = 0.30 or α = 0.40, but if a is either smaller
or larger, then a flat-wage contract implementing low effort choices is optimal.
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